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Abstract
The “iteration argument” presented in Schlicht (1996) shows that the
allocation of property rights may generate inefficiencies, contrary to what
the “Coase Theorem,” as commonly understood, asserts. The argument may
be summarized by saying that markets (and bargaining) cease to function
properly if several people are entitled and prepared to engage in the same
externality-ridden activity and each of them has to be bribed individually from
being the first offender. Given that the harm from pollution does not rise
linearily with the amount of pollution, the sum-total of the damages produced
when all of the potential offenders engage in the harmful activity may be
smaller than the sum-total of the bribes which must be offered to prevent each
potential offender from starting the offensive activity, even if the ensuing social
damages exceed the associated private returns and an inefficient outcome is
obtained. If pollution without permission by the community is not permitted,
a different – and in this case efficient – outcome results.
*This is an excerpt of Schlicht (1997) which was originally written as a comment on Bütter
and Schäfer (1997). As this is taken out of context, some clarifying additions are added in teal.
†Professor emeritus of economics, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich, Germany (schlicht@
lmu.de). I thank Knut Borchardt, Ariane Breitfelder, Andreas Gösele, Wemer Güth, Dieter Gnmm,
Timur Kuran, Florian Mayer-Haßelwander, John Komlos, Peter Mücke, Andreas Nicohn, Enk
Leyers, Ray Rees and Jame~ Scoville for helpful comments on some issues discussed in this note.
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An understanding of market processes requires an understanding of the advantages
of market organization as well as an appreciation of the limits of markets. Economists
may be quick in pointing out the advantages obtainable from introducing markets
in realms of life which, up to now, have been coordinated by other mechanisms, but
they may respond with less confidence when asked under what conditions markets
perform poorly. When arguing for markets, they may present a coherent deductive
argument, while resorting to sundry ad-hoc reasoning when induced to argue m
the other direction.1 It will be easy for any economist, for example, to write a
well-argued essay about the advantages of making voting rights salable, introducing
markets for newborn babies, or monetising Christmas gifts. To explain and defend
the systematic absence of such markets is much more difficult.2
We do not understand markets if we do not understand their limits. The conun-
drum about the limits of markets has, up to now, received two main systematic
answers, related to informational asymmetry and asset specificity, respectively. The
issue of informational asymmetry has been elaborated in several contributions
(Farrell 1987, Illing 1992, Schweizer 1988). The specificity argument, popular-
ized by Williamson (1985) in the transactions cost framework, has not remained
undisputed, however. Coase (1993, 69-72) has argued for example that specificity
problems can be solved, and are often solved, by market contracting.
The “iteration argument” presented in Schlicht (1996) offers a further argument
about the limit of markets which is quite remote from what is commonly understood
as transaction costs. It may be summarized by saying that markets (and bargaining)
cease to function properly if several people are prepared to engage in the same
externality-ridden activity and each of them has to be bribed individually by the
affected individuals of the community from being the first offender. The sum-total
of the damages to the community produced when all of the potential offenders
engage in the harmful activity may be smaller than the sum-total of the bribes which
must be offered by the community to prevent each potential offender from starting
the offensive activity, even if the ensuing social damages exceed the associated private
returns.
The following example illustrates the core issue. Assume that there are three poten-
tial offenders. Each of them has the right to start the externality-ridden activity. If
1 Some of these reasons may even be inadmissible within the economic argument This applies in
particular to ethical reasons against the market, because preferences, properly defined, will compnse
ethical preferences. There is no systematic reason to suppose that the market cares for “normal” but
never for “ethical” preferences.
2 See, however, Titmuss (1970) and Frey (1997).
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they enter in sequence, their private profits are (10, 5, 2) while the externalities they
create are (15, 6, 1). In order to bribe each of them from being the first offender,
a bribe exceeding 10 must be offered to each of them. The accruing costs exceed
30, while the externalities amount to 22. It is, thus, not worthwhile to offer side-
payments to the first offender, although the sum-total of profits (17) is smaller than
the sum-total of the damages (22). It is, further, not worthwhile to bribe the last
entrant from not entering because this would be inefficient (his profit of 2 exceeds
the damages of 1 he creates). There is no way to solve the problem in an incremental
fashion. A grand coalition would be required to solve the issue, but this entails
other difficulties.
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